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Note 
 
The Last Judicial Frontier: The Fight for 
Recognition and Legitimacy of Tribal Courts 
Robert J. Wild 
On July 2, 2018, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a 
new rule governing the recognition and enforcement of tribal 
court orders and judgments in Minnesota district courts.1 
Through clearer language and diminished judicial discretion, 
the new rule is a significant step toward respecting tribal sover-
eignty and ensuring tribal and state courts work together to pro-
mote justice. This Note pushes the new Minnesota rule further 
and proposes a solution that is designed to address issues that 
exist in Minnesota under the old rule and other states who have 
similar rules. The new rule in Minnesota is untested, but the old 
rule led to delays in recognition and to the refusal to enforce 
tribal court orders where recognition was mandated by state or 
federal law. One such example of these issues is illustrated by 
the story of Steven and his son, Walter.2 
 
   J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. I am ex-
tremely grateful to Cody Nelson and all the staff at Anishinabe Legal Services 
who sparked my interest in Indian law and showed me what taking passion in 
your work truly looks like. Thank you to everyone who provided ideas and feed-
back throughout the writing process, especially Minnesota Supreme Court Jus-
tice Anne McKeig, Peter Rademacher, Frances R. Fink, Christopher Conway, 
and Minnesota Law Review editors and staff. A special thank you to Maura 
Williams-Freier for taking the time to teach me how to be a better writer and 
for editing many drafts of this Note. Thank you to my family, especially my 
mother, for the love and support throughout law school and the writing process. 
Lastly, thank you to all the people who have fought and advocated for Native 
American rights. The work is far from over, but progress is being made. Copy-
right © 2019 by Robert J. Wild. 
 1. Order Promulgating Amendments to the General Rules of Practice for 
the District Courts (Rule 10 – Tribal Court Judgments and Orders), No. 
ADM09-8009 (Minn. Sept. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Rule 10 Order]. 
 2. The facts of this story are based on a case the author of this Note helped 
litigate. To protect the identity of the client, the names of the parties have been 
altered and the location of the dispute has been omitted. 
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Steven was born and raised on a Native American Indian 
Reservation in Northern Minnesota and, but for the four years 
he served in the U. S. Navy, he spent his entire life on the reser-
vation.3 For over ten years, Steven was embroiled in a fierce and 
contentious child custody battle in his tribe’s tribal court regard-
ing his son, Walter, with Walter’s biological mother, Carol. Over 
those ten years, Steven gained and lost custody and visitation 
rights to Walter. At what seemed to be the end of the custody 
dispute, Steven finally received a court order issuing him and 
Carol equal custody and visitation rights. However, the heart-
ache and legal battle was far from over. 
Instead of complying with the court order for custody and 
visitation, Carol chose to move off the reservation so that the 
Tribe no longer had jurisdiction over her and Walter. This effec-
tively allowed Carol to disregard the tribal court order and es-
cape any repercussions. Steven contacted state police, but upon 
asking the police to enforce the tribal court order, the police re-
fused because the tribal court order was not from a state court. 
Steven was left devastated. He felt like his child had been kid-
napped. 
Not giving up hope, Steven contacted different law offices 
and legal organizations, but they were either unwilling to help 
or told him that there was nothing he could do. Two years went 
by without seeing Walter, but Steven continued to search for a 
solution. After doing some research on his own, Steven filed a 
petition in Minnesota state court to have the tribal court custody 
order enforced in Minnesota. The state court judge wrongly4 de-
nied Steven’s petition, citing Rule 10.02 of the Minnesota Gen-
eral Rules of Practice, which, prior to the implementation of the 
new rule, gave judges broad discretion in deciding to recognize 
tribal court orders.5 The state court judge was required to grant 
 
 3. DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SU-
PREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 19 (1997) (noting that tribes have 
traits, practices, and a culture that is different from predominant Euro-Ameri-
can cultural characteristics). Many tribal members residing on reservations face 
abject poverty, alcoholism, and substance abuse problems. Id. (“[M]ost tribal 
nations are severely disadvantaged economically and have astounding levels of 
unemployment and poverty.”). 
 4. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10.01(a) (2003) (mandating child custody de-
terminations, including those of tribal courts, be recognized and enforced pur-
suant to the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, MINN. STAT. 
§ 518D.104 (2018)). 
 5. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10.02 (2003). The previous version of Rule 10.02 
gave judges unlimited discretion in deciding if they wish to recognize a tribal 
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Steven’s petition pursuant to Rule 10.01 of the Minnesota Gen-
eral Rules of Practice because child custody orders from a tribal 
court were required to be recognized by statute.6 
With yet another setback, Steven was left feeling like the 
country he served to protect was preventing him from seeing his 
son. Finally, after two years of searching, Steven found a legal 
organization who drafted a petition on his behalf and repre-
sented him in Minnesota state court. The Minnesota court sub-
sequently granted Steven’s petition and after thirteen years, his 
fight to have custody and visitation rights to Walter was finally 
over. 
This story has a happy outcome, but it illustrates why it was 
imperative to amend the old rule that gave judges broad discre-
tion when deciding to enforce a tribal court order. The story fur-
ther illustrates why states with similar rules should also con-
sider enacting change. Minnesota’s recognition scheme was not 
fully responsible for the thirteen-year legal battle Steven faced,7 
but it certainly delayed justice and, as the adage goes, justice 
delayed is justice denied. 
This Note explores the level of deference and process in 
which tribal court orders8 are recognized and enforced in state 
courts.9 This Note focuses on the tribal-state relationship in-
 
court order, whereas Rule 10.01 afforded judges zero discretion. See infra Part 
II.A.2.b (discussing the previous Minnesota rules).  
 6. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10.01 (2003) (requiring tribal court orders be 
recognized and enforced as mandated by statute); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 518D.104. 
 7. The amount of time Steven’s family law issues were litigated for is sim-
ilar to the amount of time some family law cases are litigated in state family 
courts. The long time that the case was litigated in the tribal court should not 
be looked at as a poor reflection of the tribal court. 
 8. This Note uses “tribal court order” and “tribal court judgment” inter-
changeably. 
 9. The use of “deference” in this Note refers to how much respect tribal 
courts are shown as competent legal bodies. This Note will use the terms “rec-
ognized” and “enforced” interchangeably at times to refer to tribal court orders 
being given effect in state courts. As one author points out,  
[a]lthough often used interchangeably, the terms “enforcement” and 
“recognition” of foreign judgments refer to two distinct concepts. En-
forcement occurs when a court compels a defendant to satisfy a judg-
ment that has been rendered against him or her in the court of a foreign 
nation. While a court must recognize a judgment in order to enforce it, 
recognition may also occur independently of enforcement. Recognition 
occurs when a court precludes litigation of a claim or issue because that 
claim or issue was previously litigated in the court of a foreign nation. 
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stead of tribal-federal because there is greater interaction be-
tween tribes and states. Particular emphasis will be given to 
Minnesota, given it is the most recent state to consider and 
promulgate significant changes to the way tribal court orders are 
recognized in the state. The recent amendment and historical 
development of the rule in Minnesota will be used to show the 
direction this area of the law is heading. 
Part I introduces the basics of tribal courts and briefly dis-
cusses their sovereignty and jurisdiction as related to state and 
federal courts. It also discusses the unique features of tribal 
courts. Part II addresses the question of how much deference 
should be given to tribal court orders and describes differing 
viewpoints on that question. The historical development of the 
rule in Minnesota and the recent changes made by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court will be discussed and will serve as an exam-
ple of a recent approach to address these issues. Finally, Part III 
argues that state legislatures should amend their state constitu-
tions to give full faith and credit to tribal court orders to best 
increase tribal sovereignty and clarify the status of tribal courts 
in the American legal system. 
I.  TRIBAL COURTS: STARTED AT THE BOTTOM AND 
THEY ARE STILL THERE   
Although tribal courts have been a part of the American le-
gal landscape since the nineteenth century, their judicial author-
ity is not considered equal to that of state and federal courts.10 
Section A discusses the historical evolution and unique features 
of tribal courts. This Section also covers the current jurisdic-
tional framework many tribal courts operate under and explains 
how this jurisdictional framework fits into the overall frame-
work for tribal sovereignty. Section B concludes with a discus-
sion of the amount of deference that different state courts cur-
rently give to tribal court judgments. 
 
Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 
147, 147 (2001). 
 10. See United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (100 How.) 104 (1855) 
(noting the existence of the Cherokee judicial system). 
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A. TRIBAL COURTS: THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE FORGOTTEN 
THIRD SOVEREIGN 
There are three distinct sovereign entities in the United 
States: the federal government, state governments, and Indian 
tribes.11 Each sovereign has its own distinct judicial system.12 
Just like state and federal courts, tribal courts have jurisdiction 
over certain disputes,13 but “[t]ribal courts are not United States 
courts.”14 Many people, including those with a legal education, 
know little about tribal courts.15 Despite this, tribal courts have 
been developing steadily and have increasingly “becom[e] an im-
portant part of the judicial fabric of the United States.”16 To un-
derstand the current status of tribal courts and the problems 
they face, a discussion of their historical development is neces-
sary.17 
1. The Historical Development of Tribal Courts is Marked by a 
Confusing Array of Statutes and Changing Policies.  
The relationship between tribal courts and the United 
States is characterized by paternalism. Through myriad statutes 
enacted since the 19th century, the growth of tribal judicial sys-
tems have been constrained by dense and confusing statutory 
frameworks. Given that the United States federal government 
 
 11. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal 
Courts, 33 U. TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (asserting that there are three separate 
sovereign governments in the United States). 
 12. Id. This Note will refer to the judicial systems and individual courts 
operated by any tribal governments as tribal courts. 
 13. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1986) (holding tribal 
courts have jurisdiction over disputes in their territory); infra Part I.A.3. 
 14. Korey Wahwassuck, The New Face of Justice: Joint Tribal-State Juris-
diction, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 733, 733 (2008). 
 15. B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: 
Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 467 (1998) (explaining that some attorneys avoid litiga-
tion in tribal courts because they perceive the applicable law to be inaccessible). 
 16. Kevin K. Washburn & Chloe Thompson, A Legacy of Public Law 280: 
Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota’s New Rule for the Recognition of Tribal 
Court Judgments with the Recent Arizona Rule, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 479, 
480 (2004). 
 17. See Jones, supra note 15, at 467–68 (asserting that it is important for 
someone who does not know much about tribal courts to understand the histor-
ical evolution of the courts to begin to understand and appreciate them). 
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possesses plenary power18 over tribes,19 Congress is free to con-
trol the development of tribal courts as it sees fit.20 In the federal 
Indian policy context, there is considerable disagreement sur-
rounding the nature of plenary power.21 Some argue that this 
power is exclusive to Congress and Congress may exercise it over 
Native Americans without regard for constitutional restraints.22 
Others view Congress’s exercise of plenary power over Native 
Americans as nothing more than an arbitrary means by which it 
is able “to oppress or even eradicate tribal or individual political, 
civil, or property rights.”23 For now, tribes have the power and 
ability to govern themselves by creating and enforcing their own 
policies and laws, but that power could be taken away by Con-
gress at any time, spelling the end of tribal judicial systems.24 
The policy of the United States, today, is to respect the independ-
ence of tribal courts and help them develop into competent legal 
bodies.25 However, these goals have not always been advanced, 
which leaves tribal courts no choice but to operate in a state of 
uncertainty, not knowing if Congress will take away their au-
thority unexpectedly. A brief historical overview of the develop-
ment of tribal courts illustrates this uncertainty. 
 
 18. Plenary Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Power that 
is broadly construed; esp., a court’s power to dispose of any matter properly be-
fore it.”). The Supreme Court first cited “plenary power” in 1824 to describe the 
powers of Congress. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 17 (1824). 
 19. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 
(1985) (“[T]he power of the Federal Government over the Indian tribes is ple-
nary.”); Charles J. Hyland, The Tribal Court: Where Does It Fit?, 65 J. KAN. B. 
ASS’N 14, 15 (1996) (“[T]he power of the federal government over Indian Tribes 
is plenary.”). 
 20. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“Congress 
has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-gov-
ernment which the tribes otherwise possess.”). 
 21. WILKINS, supra note 3, at 25. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Daina B. Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a Fed-
eral Courts Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit 
Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723, 744 (1996) (“[T]he federal government has the ability 
to extinguish tribes, tribal courts, and tribal procedures.”); Wahwassuck, supra 
note 14, at 734. 
 25. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 398 (3d ed. 1991). 
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a. First Glimpse: From Ex parte Crow Dog to the Major 
Crimes Act 
Most tribal courts were brought into being because of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.26 Prior to the passage of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the first signs that tribes may 
be able to have their own judicial systems came in 1883 when 
the United States Supreme Court held in Ex parte Crow Dog that 
territorial courts did not have jurisdiction over criminal offenses 
committed by one Indian against another within Indian coun-
try.27 This decision allowed Native Americans to determine the 
appropriate punishment for crimes that one band member com-
mits against another band member.28 While Ex parte Crow Dog 
illustrated the need for a reservation-based dispute system, it 
also served as the catalyst for the creation of law and policies 
aimed at taking away tribal sovereignty.29 
In an attempt to address the need for a reservation-based 
dispute system, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) started es-
tablishing “Courts of Indian Offenses” in the late 1880s.30 These 
courts were nothing like the tribal courts of today.31 The Courts 
of Indian Offenses furthered the values and customs of the BIA, 
not tribes.32 The BIA used “these courts [as] the agents of assim-
ilation, and followed laws and regulations designed to assimilate 
the Indian people into both the religious and jurisprudential 
mainstream of American society.”33 Instead of being used as a 
mechanism designed to enhance tribal sovereignty and legiti-
macy, the Courts of Indian Offenses were used as a mechanism 
to perpetuate racism and oppression; strip Native Americans of 
 
 26. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2012)). 
 27. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883). 
 28. Id. (“[O]ffences committed by Indians against . . . each other [are] left to 
be dealt with by each tribe for itself, according to its local customs.”). 
 29. WILKINS, supra note 3, at 68 (describing the decision in Ex parte Crow 
Dog as enhancing tribal sovereignty and also taking it away). 
 30. Jones, supra note 15, at 469; see also O’Connor, supra note 11. 
 31. Id. at 470. 
 32. Id. The BIA decided what rules and policies would be enforced by the 
Courts of Indian Offenses, which left tribes with little control over their govern-
ance. See id. at 469–70 n.43 (explaining that the BIA was setting up the courts 
illegally, but challenges to their authority were unsuccessful, which left the BIA 
free to do as it pleased with the court system it created). 
 33. Id. at 470. 
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their customs, culture, and heritage; and erase any notion of 
tribal sovereignty and legitimacy.34  
Congress, viewing the Ex parte Crow Dog decision as creat-
ing a void in the enforcement of criminal law, and wishing to 
claw back the sovereignty and jurisdiction tribes gained from the 
decision,35 passed the Major Crimes Act in 1885.36 The Major 
Crimes Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over certain crimes 
that are committed by a Native American against another Na-
tive American on tribal lands.37 The passage of the Act erased 
any progress towards the creation of a tribal judicial system by 
restoring the legal landscape to what it was prior to Ex parte 
Crow Dog.38 
b. Turbulent Times: Shifting Federal Indian Policy and 
Laying the Groundwork for the Tribal Courts of Today 
It was not until the passage of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 “and the subsequent promulgation of a revised Code 
of Indian Offenses for Indian tribes,” that Indian tribes were able 
to create and adopt their own codes and laws and were free to 
create a judicial system to enforce those laws.39 This was the 
start of a new era of Indian policy whereby Congress sought to 
strengthen and protect tribal culture, and political and social or-
ganizations.40 The dramatic shift in policy and the passage of the 
Indian Reorganization Act laid the foundation for modern tribal 
courts even though this era did not last long.41 
 
 34. See WILKINS, supra note 3, at 64 (“The congressional acts and policies 
responsible for most of these vast reductions of tribal sovereignty, property, and 
civil and political rights include[s] . . . the establishment of the Courts of Indian 
Offenses . . . .”); cf. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (“These 
‘courts of Indian offenses’ are . . . but mere educational and disciplinary instru-
mentalities, by which the government of the United States is endeavoring to 
improve and elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to whom it sustains 
the relation of guardian. In fact, the reservation itself is in the nature of a 
school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the 
purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the 
civilized from the uncivilized man.”). 
 35. See WILKINS, supra note 3, at 68–69; see also Jones, supra note 15, at 
469. 
 36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013). 
 37. Id. 
 38. WILKINS, supra note 3, at 68–69. 
 39. Jones, supra note 15, at 470–71. 
 40. WILKINS, supra note 3, at 118. 
 41. Id. (noting the favorable policy shift towards Native Americans only 
lasted from 1934–45). 
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After the Indian Reorganization Act, the next important 
statute for tribal court development was Public Law 83-280 
(“Public Law 280”) in 1953, which enabled states to assume crim-
inal, as well as civil, jurisdiction in matters involving Native 
Americans as litigants on reservation land.42 Public Law 280 fur-
thered “Congress’s long term design to terminate the special re-
lationship that Indian tribes had with the United States, end 
tribal governance, and subject individual Indians . . . to the gen-
eral laws of the states.”43 Public Law 280 embodied this termi-
nation policy, and both the BIA and tribes ceased to invest 
money in tribal courts.44 
After experiencing a growth stunt at the hands of Public 
Law 280, the passage of The Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) of 
1968 further controlled the development of tribal courts.45 The 
ICRA is the last statute that has played a major role in the for-
mation of modern tribal courts.46 The ICRA mandates that tribes 
“base their judicial system on Anglo-American notions of due 
process by superimposing many of the fundamental rights of the 
United States Constitution upon tribal justice systems . . . .”47 
While this could be seen as a positive, some commentators have 
noted that this is an example of paternalism making its way into 
the development of tribal courts.48 With a brief understanding of 
 
 42. Public Law 280, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (Aug. 15, 1953) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–26 (1994), 28 
U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)). 
 43. Washburn & Thompson, supra note 16, at 519; see also WILKINS, supra 
note 3, at 166–67 (explaining that the passage of Public Law 280 and the Fed-
eral government’s policy of physically relocating Native Americans contributed 
to the goal of assimilating Native Americans into United States culture). 
 44. Jones, supra note 15, at 472. 
 45. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2012). 
 46. For other influential statutes that led up to the passage of the ICRA, 
see WILKINS, supra note 3, at 64 (“The congressional acts and policies responsi-
ble for most of these vast reductions of tribal sovereignty, property, and civil 
and political rights included the assignment of Indian agencies to religious so-
cieties; the establishment of the Courts of Indian Offenses; the Major Crimes 
Act of 1885; the General Allotment Act of 1887; the 1891 amendment to the 
General Allotment Act; the Curtis Act of 1898; and the Burke Act of 1906.”). 
 47. Jones, supra note 15, at 474. 
 48. Id. at 474–75 (“This history of externally imposed justice is not an aus-
picious foundation for the development of indigenous justice systems, and may 
explain why the uninitiated may find tribal justice systems especially confound-
ing.”). Setting aside arguments for the merits of following the Bill of Rights, 
forcing legal concepts and laws upon another nation which has a distinct cul-
ture, different customs, and markedly different conceptions of justice is seen by 
some as a form of cultural imperialism. See WILKINS, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
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the confusing, and at times contradictory, policies and laws that 
have impacted the development of tribal courts, this Note’s pro-
posal serves as a way to clear up the confusion and uncertainty 
that surrounds tribal courts. 
2. The Modern Tribal Court 
Despite a history of ups and downs, tribal courts have sur-
vived years of laws and policies aimed at their termination.49 Be-
cause Congress created the statutes that grant power to tribal 
courts, tribal judicial systems mirror state and federal courts.50 
Tribal courts typically operate the same divisions, such as crim-
inal, juvenile, and civil divisions.51 Judges and lawyers are “law 
trained,” which means they have graduated from law schools in 
the United States and many of them are members of state bar 
associations.52 Judges are often screened by a branch of govern-
ment that is separate from the judiciary.53 Tribal courts have 
their own rules of procedure.54 Just like state and federal courts, 
tribal courts typically have both a trial court and appellate 
court.55 Increasing use of alternative dispute resolution in state 
and federal courts is paralleled by tribal courts’ use of less-for-
mal and less-adversarial mechanisms for dispute resolution.56 
 
 49. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 50. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.04[3][C], at 267 (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 5. 
 53. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 50. For a more in-depth discussion of 
how tribal judges are vetted, see Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, 
the Lower Sioux Indian Community, the Upper Sioux Community, and the Prai-
rie Island Indian Community, Supplemental Filings for Petition of Minnesota 
Tribal Court/State Court Forum to Amend Rule 10 at 5, No. ADM09-8009 (filed 
July 2, 2018), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Tribal-Orders/ 
Supplemental%20Hearing%20Submissions/SMSC-LSIC-USC-PIIC 
-Supplemental-Filing-to-Rule-10-Petition-final.pdf. 
 54. Washburn & Thompson, supra note 16, at 517; see also O’Connor, supra 
note 11, at 2. 
 55. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 50; see also O’Connor, supra note 11, 
at 5 (“[M]ore and more tribal judicial systems have established mechanisms to 
ensure the effective appealability of decisions to higher courts.”). 
 56. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 4–5 (noting that tribal courts have been 
developing alternative ways to settle disputes that are less adversarial, more 
agreeable, faster, and less expensive). 
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Even though there are many similarities between state, fed-
eral, and tribal courts, there are also some unique characteris-
tics and struggles that are unique to tribal courts.57 The starkest 
difference between tribal courts and US courts is the incorpora-
tion of Native American values into the judicial process.58 A na-
tion’s conception of justice is shaped by its cultural values and 
customs, which in turn dictates the way its judicial system oper-
ates.59 It is difficult to describe how a foreign court adjudicates 
in the context of its nation’s cultural values and customs.60 It is 
even harder to discuss how those values and customs are imple-
mented.61 “Explaining how disputes are resolved extra-judicially 
among any group of people is a little akin to empirically describ-
ing how one puts his pants on in the morning: it is done subcon-
sciously without attributing some method or technique to the ex-
perience.”62 
Characteristics that make tribal courts unique range from 
the physical presence of tribal courtrooms to the collaborative 
and inclusive judicial procedures many tribal courts employ.63 
Differences also present themselves in the context of punish-
ment of offenders.64 For example, the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe 
Juvenile Justice Code allows the tribal court to impose punish-
ment on juvenile offenders that is reflective of the traditions and 
customs of the tribe.65 The Code also allows tribal judges to order 
a convicted child “to apologize . . . in a traditional manner or cer-
emony to any persons who have been victimized by the minor’s 
 
 57. See, e.g., Wahwassuck, supra note 14, at 734–35 (discussing the simi-
larities and differences between state, federal, and tribal courts). 
 58. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 3; see, e.g., Tribal Court, LEECH LAKE BAND 
OJIBWE, http://www.llojibwe.org/court/court.html (last visited Nov. 8 2018) 
(stating that the mission of the Leech Lake Tribal Court is “[t]o Establish [sic] 
a fair and effective justice system incorporating research-based practices and 
Ojibwe culture and values; to protect the rights of the Leech Lake Band of 
Ojibwe people; to preserve natural and Band resources; and to promote peace, 
health and public safety within the Leech Lake Reservation”). 
 59. Jones, supra note 15, at 466. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 2; see also Carl H. Johnson, A Comity of 
Errors: Why John v. Baker Is Only a Tentative First Step in the Right Direction, 
18 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2001). 
 64. See, e.g., LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE JUDICIAL CODE tit. 4, § 4-13(E) 
(establishing that a tribal court may impose punishment on juvenile offenders 
that is reflective of the traditions and customs of the tribe). 
 65. Id. 
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conduct; including family members, Band officials, and/or com-
munity at large.”66 One such example of this type of punishment 
is ordering a minor who violates the tribe’s tobacco code to attend 
meetings with a tribal elder to learn about the historical role of 
tobacco in the tribe’s culture and then give a presentation on 
what they learned to a panel of elders. 
Although culture and custom may play a role in state and 
federal courts by, for instance, shaping conceptions of justice, 
they are much more significant in tribal courts.67 The codifica-
tion of tribal customs and traditions into the laws and proce-
dures of tribal courts reflects a different set of priorities from 
state and federal courts. It may well be these differences in pri-
ority and conceptions of justice that lead to an unwillingness to 
enforce tribal court orders by American courts. Despite the dif-
ferences, tribal and American courts are both competent judicial 
bodies capable of administering justice that comport with their 
nation’s cultural values. 
3. Tribal Sovereignty and Tribal Court Jurisdiction: 
Intertwined from the Start 
The degree of a tribal court’s sovereignty influences its ju-
risdictional reach.68 The history of tribal sovereignty and the ju-
risdiction tribal courts can exercise has ebbed and flowed 
through the statutory framework that led to the creation of tribal 
courts.69 To understand tribal courts, one needs to have a grasp 
on the development of tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. In the 
following subsections, the status of tribal sovereignty will be dis-
cussed, followed by a discussion of tribal jurisdiction. 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., id. § 4-1 (“[The goal of this code is] [t]o recognize and 
acknowledge the tribal customs and traditions of the Leech Lake Ojibwe and to 
utilize the same whenever applicable to promote the well-being of Indian chil-
dren who come before the Juvenile Division . . . [and] [t]o provide culturally spe-
cific programming whenever possible.”). 
 68. Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, 
Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian 
Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433, 438 (1996) (asserting that jurisdiction is essential 
to and defines sovereignty); Jones, supra note 15, at 485 (“Tribal courts tend to 
be very jealous about the exercise of their valid jurisdiction, simply because they 
see that jurisdiction as an extension of their sovereignty and erosions upon it as 
threats to their survival as distinct nations.”). 
 69. See supra Part I.A.1. See WILKINS, supra note 3, for an exhaustive dis-
cussion of the legislation and landmark cases that have affected tribal sover-
eignty. 
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a. An Overview of Tribal Sovereignty 
Tribal sovereignty is a difficult concept to grasp and is even 
more difficult to define given tribes have inherent sovereignty 
and sovereignty that is granted by the United States. The inher-
ent sovereignty that tribes possess is unusual in that their sov-
ereignty predates the United States Constitution,70 yet the abil-
ity to operate as an autonomous nation is subject to the control 
of Congress.71 Tribal sovereignty has long been recognized and 
is well established in the United States.72 Tribes are not consid-
ered states;73 rather, they are “denominated domestic dependent 
nations,”74 which leaves them with less sovereignty than a for-
eign nation.75 “[Indian tribes] are subordinate and dependent na-
tions possessed of all powers as such only to the extent that they 
have expressly been required to surrender them by the superior 
sovereign, the United States.”76 Indian tribes can set up their 
own governments and exercise authority over their lands and 
members.77 Tribal sovereignty goes beyond the powers given to 
a tribe to embody a cultural/spiritual dimension.78 Tribal sover-
eignty “‘can be said to consist more of continued cultural integ-
rity than of political powers and to the degree that a nation loses 
 
 70. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 25, at 312; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 
U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (asserting that the rights to self-govern were not delegated 
by Congress and thus not powers arising from or created by the federal Consti-
tution). 
 71. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (“As 
dependents, the tribes are subject to the plenary control by Congress.”). 
 72. Gordon K. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1401 (1985) (referencing Supreme Court cases from 1832 
and 1975, both of which affirmed tribal sovereignty). 
 73. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 25, at 317–18. 
 74. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 17 (1831). 
 75. Id. at 17–18 (evidencing this relationship, inter alia, by describing how 
an act of war against an Indian Tribe would be “considered by all” to be an in-
vasion of the United States). 
 76. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th 
Cir. 1959); see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 25, at 320 (“[W]hat is not ex-
pressly limited [by the Federal government] remains within the domain of tribal 
sovereignty.” (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 122)). 
 77. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16 (explaining how the treaties made be-
tween the United States and tribes evidences their sovereignty); see also WIL-
KINS, supra note 3, at 20 (detailing the rights that tribal sovereignty affords 
tribal governments). 
 78. WILKINS, supra note 3, at 20. 
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its sense of cultural identity, to that degree it suffers a loss of 
sovereignty.’”79 
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that tribal 
sovereignty extends as far as is necessary “to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.”80 Even though 
“tribes are pre-constitutional entities whose sovereignty does not 
spring from either the federal government or the Constitution,”81 
the status of their sovereignty is ultimately controlled by Con-
gress, who can choose to broaden or narrow it.82 Since 1980, the 
federal government has only added to the confusion regarding 
the status of tribal sovereignty by adopting laws and policies 
that enhance tribal sovereignty on one hand, while simultane-
ously taking it away and denying Native Americans Constitu-
tional rights at the same time.83 All of this has led to confusion 
and uncertainty as to how autonomous tribes can be. 
b. Tribal Court Jurisdiction 
Tribal courts have wide jurisdiction within their territory 
and even some outside of it.84 Tribes retain the authority to pros-
ecute members for crimes committed in Indian country, a power 
“justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and 
the concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the 
authority of which rests on consent.”85 For tribes subject to Pub-
lic Law 280, the federal government has jurisdiction over certain 
crimes committed on Indian lands.86 And, under Public Law 280, 
 
 79. David E. Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Explication of “Federal Ple-
nary Power”: An Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886–1914, 
18 AM. INDIAN Q. 349, 350 (quoting Vine Deloria Jr.).  
 80. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 546 (1981). 
 81. Craig Smith, Full Faith and Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition 
of Tribal Court Decisions Revisited, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1393, 1415 (2010). 
 82. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (stat-
ing that tribes retain their “historic sovereign authority” up to and until Con-
gressional action). 
 83. WILKINS, supra note 3, at 235 (explaining that the federal Indian policy 
and statutes applicable to tribes have been in conflict, whereby policy dictates 
that tribal governments should be bolstered and promoted, while some statutes 
do the opposite). 
 84. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 145–46. 
 85. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990). 
 86. See Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012) (extending “State, 
Territory, Possession, or District” jurisdiction over any crimes committed in 
places, such as including Indian country, within those areas); Indian Country 
Crimes Act, id. § 1152 (2012) (“[T]he general laws of the United States as to the 
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states have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over some crimes 
arising in Indian country.87 Under federal common law, tribes 
generally do not possess inherent prosecutorial authority over 
non-Indians.88 This is not, however, an absolute rule.89 Moreo-
ver, Congress may delegate federal prosecutorial authority to 
tribes if it wants.90 
With respect to civil jurisdiction, tribes retain inherent au-
thority over their members and their territory.91 This includes 
the “power of regulating their internal and social relations.”92 
Thus, tribes may exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over the 
conduct of their members and the conduct of nonmembers that 
enter onto tribally owned lands. Except under certain circum-
stances, tribes do not have the power to exercise civil jurisdiction 
over nonmember conduct on non-tribal land.93 Congress, how-
ever, is free to clarify the confines of tribal inherent power to 
exercise civil jurisdiction, to limit that power, or to delegate ad-
ditional federal power. Indeed, Congress has reaffirmed that 
tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction with the federal govern-
ment over specified civil matters.94 Even though tribes have the 
authority to adjudicate over certain matters, that does not mean 
that states respect tribal adjudicatory authority by recognizing, 
as legitimate, tribal court judgments. 
 
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall extend to the Indian country.”). 
 87. Id. § 1162 (“[J]urisdiction over [Indian country] shall be concurrent 
among the Federal Government, State governments, and, where applicable, 
tribal governments.”). 
 88. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 89. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA), 25 
U.S.C. § 1304 (2016) (affirming tribal authority to exercise “special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons” under certain circumstances). 
 90. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (“[E]ven ignoring treaty provisions and 
congressional policy, Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”). 
 91. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) 
(“Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and 
their territory.” (citations omitted)). 
 92. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886). However, this 
power is not absolute. See id. at 379–80 (finding that because the Indians are 
within the geographical boundary of the United States, Congress has the power 
to grant them the authority to make their own laws, but that power could be 
withdrawn, modified, or repealed at any time by Congress). 
 93. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–66 (1981) (specifying cir-
cumstances when tribes have the power to adjudicate over non-member conduct 
on non-tribal land). 
 94. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at 145 (citing examples). 
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B. GIVING DEFERENCE TO TRIBAL COURT ORDERS IN STATE 
COURTS: FULL FAITH AND CREDIT VERSUS JUDICIAL COMITY 
The extent to which tribal court orders should be recognized 
and enforced in state courts is fiercely debated.95 “Currently, 
tribal, federal, and state courts generally recognize the judg-
ments and other public acts of one another in one of two ways: 
on the basis of a judicial determination of comity, or pursuant to 
a legislative or constitutional full faith and credit command.”96 
Some authors argue that tribes should be treated as a state or 
territory of the United States and therefore tribal court orders 
should be given full faith and credit.97 Others argue that there 
should not be any rules or procedures governing the recognition 
and enforcement of tribal court orders because any rule is simply 
a perpetuation of colonialism and paternalism.98 The way in 
which states choose to recognize tribal court orders, if at all, is 
inconsistent. There are many important distinctions between ju-
dicial comity and full faith and credit, and this section will intro-
duce both concepts.99 
1. Full Faith and Credit Represents the Highest Level of 
Deference Given to a Foreign Judicial Order 
At its core, full faith and credit essentially mandates that 
courts recognize and enforce another court’s judgment, even if 
they would rather leave the judgment unenforced.100 Courts can 
still exercise a modicum of discretion, such as determining 
whether the issuing court had proper jurisdiction.101 The concept 
 
 95. See generally Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311 (2000) 
(providing an overview of different arguments and concluding that non-tribal 
courts have several problematic reasons for not recognizing tribal court judg-
ments). 
 96. Smith, supra note 81, at 1394. There is also a third category that is 
characterized by courts simply ignoring the judgements of other courts. Id. at 
1394 n.4. 
 97. Id. at 1434–35, 1434 n.267. 
 98. Frank Bibeau, Public Comment to Petition to Amend Rule 10 of the 
Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts, File No. ADM09-
8009 (2018). 
 99. B.J. Jones, Tribal Considerations in Comity and Full Faith and Credit 
Issues, 68 N.D. L. REV. 689, 689–91 (1992) (discussing differences between com-
ity and full faith and credit). 
 100. Wright, supra note 72, at 1412. 
 101. See Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 341 U.S. 201, 210 (1941) (positing 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not an “inexorable and unqualified” 
command); see also Wright, supra note 72, at 1413 (noting that a reviewing court 
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of full faith and credit as a legal term and full faith and credit as 
a constitutional concept are distinct. The concept of full faith and 
credit is found in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United 
States Constitution.102 Congress made the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause applicable to all states, territories, and possessions of the 
United States by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1738.103 There is some dis-
pute as to whether the Full Faith and Credit Act extends to 
tribes.104 However, individual states are able to extend full faith 
and credit to tribal court orders through state court decisions or 
by establishing it through the state legislature.105 
The purpose of full faith and credit is to bring many different 
sovereigns together to promote unity by requiring the judicial 
and political processes of each sovereign to be respected.106 When 
it comes to giving deference to tribal court orders because of a 
full faith and credit mandate, under a plain reading of the con-
cept, state courts are required to recognize and enforce the tribal 
court order without question.107 Full faith and credit represents 
the highest level of deference given to tribal court judgments.108 
2. Judicial Comity Often Gives Judges Broad Discretion When 
Deciding to Enforce a Foreign Judicial Order 
Judicial comity is a much less rigid concept; courts are able 
to exercise broad discretion in deciding whether to recognize and 
enforce another court’s order.109 Comity is best described as “the 
 
may not alter judgment on the merits of the order, but the court can adjust the 
remedy). 
 102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring states to extend full faith and credit 
to the judgment and public acts of another state). 
 103. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018) (granting full faith and credit to all judicial 
proceedings from courts in the United States, and any U.S. territory or posses-
sion). 
 104. Smith, supra note 81, at 1427–32 (describing how some of the confusion 
is due, inter alia, to unfollowed Supreme Court dicta). 
 105. Id. at 1434–35, 1434 n.267 (citing examples of states that have estab-
lished that full faith and credit is to be given to tribal court orders). It is im-
portant to note that some of the examples cited do not technically give “full” full 
faith and credit to tribal court orders because a reviewing court is authorized to 
consider one or more factors in deciding to recognize the tribal court order. See 
infra Part II.A.2 (discussing states erroneously claiming to give tribal court 
judgments full faith and credit when in reality they only afford a moderate 
amount of deference via judicial comity). 
 106. Smith, supra note 81, at 1408. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American Federalism, 
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2015) (describing the ambiguity of comity 
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recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.”110 “Com-
ity is a nebulous concept . . . [that] describes a set of reciprocal 
norms among nations that call for [states] to recognize, and 
sometimes defer to, the laws, judgments, or interests of another 
. . . [and is] . . . motivated by a desire to preserve and promote 
harmony among nations.”111 If a state decides to recognize and 
enforce tribal court judgments based on comity, the Supreme 
Court has held that states can choose to give deference, but they 
are under no obligation to do so,112 and that if they decide to de-
fer, how much they decide to is up the individual state.113 Fur-
ther, the burden of showing the judgment is not entitled to en-
forcement rests with the party whom the judgment is sought 
against, but this varies from state to state.114 While comity al-
lows a reviewing state court to apply its normative values and 
compare them to the tribal court in determining whether to give 
deference to the order at issue, full faith and credit does not al-
low such comparison and makes recognition and enforcement an 
absolute obligation.115 The most important distinction is that ju-
dicial comity does not guarantee a tribal court order will be given 
effect, but, absent a determination of lack of jurisdiction, full 
faith and credit does.116 
 
as appearing “to be a kind of shorthand deployed by judges in the hope that 
reliance on a concept that is familiar from one set of intergovernmental rela-
tions . . . will give us a better sense of how a different set of intergovernmental 
relations . . . operates”). 
 110. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
 111. Seinfeld, supra note 109, at 1309. 
 112. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64 (describing comity as “neither a matter of 
absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will”). 
 113. Smith, supra note 81, at 1394 (describing how some courts believe that 
“because tribes are sovereign political units, their judgments are entitled to a 
degree of comity,” but not total full faith and credit). 
 114. See id. But see Shen v. Daly, 222 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The 
burden of proof in establishing that the foreign judgment should be recognized 
and given preclusive effect is on the party asserting it should be recognized.”). 
 115. See Seinfeld, supra note 109, at 1319–20 (describing the difference be-
tween the two as full faith and credit being an outgrowth of the notion of com-
ity). 
 116. See id. at 1332 n.93 (describing comity usage between tribal and state 
courts). 
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II.  HOW MUCH DEFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO 
TRIBAL COURT ORDERS: ARGUMENTS THAT COVER THE 
SPECTRUM   
There is no agreement on the correct level of deference to 
give to tribal courts. The choice of judicial comity or full faith and 
credit to afford deference to tribal court orders varies by state, 
and the arguments in support of a state’s decision are vast. Sec-
tion A provides an overview of the level of deference shown to 
tribal court orders in various states—including the previous ver-
sion of Minnesota’s Rule 10. The arguments in support of each 
position will be discussed. Section B covers the new Rule 10 that 
was accepted by the Minnesota Supreme Court on July 2, 2018. 
The new Minnesota rule provides an example of the most recent 
attempt of a state to balance the interests of justice with tribal 
sovereignty. 
A. OVERVIEW OF DEFERENCE GIVEN TO TRIBAL COURT ORDERS: 
THE SPECTRUM 
Previous authors have pointed out that the level of deference 
state courts give to tribal court orders can be seen as a spectrum, 
ranging from a high, to a moderate, to a low amount of defer-
ence.117 As discussed previously, when a state gives full faith and 
credit to tribal court judgments, this represents the highest 
amount of deference.118 Comity is a lower level of deference, and 
the ultimate level of deference given varies from state to state 
within the states that use comity to decide whether to enforce a 
tribal court order. There are a variety of factors that may influ-
ence why a given state affords a high or low level of deference. 
Although that inquiry is outside the scope of this Note, it is 
worth noting that the population of Native Americans in a state 
and the amount of time a tribe’s judicial system has been in place 
may play a part.119 The discussion that follows gives specific ex-
 
 117. Washburn & Thompson, supra note 16, at 483 (“The differing ap-
proaches to the question of the recognition of tribal court judgments reflects a 
wide spectrum.”); cf. Seinfeld, supra note 109, at 1332 n.93 (portraying the spec-
trum in a similar way). 
 118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 119. As is illustrated below, states that afford a high or moderate amount of 
deference to tribal court judgments are primarily located in the Western United 
States. See infra Part II.A.1–2. The largest population levels of Native Ameri-
cans are concentrated in the Western United States. See TINA NORRIS ET AL., 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, 7 tbl.2 (2012). 
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amples of where certain states fall on the spectrum and identi-
fies the rationales for why a state may choose to give more or less 
deference. 
1. Full Faith and Credit: The Highest Level of Deference on 
the Spectrum 
a. State Examples of Full Faith and Credit 
New Mexico is currently the only state that gives full faith 
and credit to tribal court judgments.120 In Jim v. CIT Financial 
Services Corp., the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the 
Navajo Nation’s laws are afforded full faith and credit, as pro-
vided by the Full Faith and Credit Act,121 because the Navajo 
Nation satisfied the “territory” requirement of the Act.122 Conse-
quently, judgments rendered by a tribal court are given the high-
est level of deference. 
Seven years after Jim, in Sheppard v. Sheppard, the Idaho 
Supreme Court also ruled that tribal court judgments are enti-
tled to full faith and credit per the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738.123 Even though the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that tribal court orders are not equivalent to orders from another 
state, tribal court orders were still entitled to full faith and credit 
because Indian tribes are considered territories under the Act.124 
 
One of the oldest tribal judicial systems, as we conceive of a judicial system 
today, that still exists, belongs to the Cherokee Nation. See United States ex rel. 
Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (100 How.) 103 (1855) (noting the Cherokee judicial 
system predates the U.S. Constitution). The Cherokee Nation, not to be con-
fused with other populations of Cherokee throughout the country, is located in 
Oklahoma, which is defined as being within the Western United States. NORRIS 
ET AL., supra, at 8. Therefore, it is possible that population and the number of 
years a tribal court has been around may influence how much deference a state 
chooses to afford tribal court judgments. 
 120. Washburn & Thompson, supra note 16, at 483. 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018). 
 122. Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 753 (N.M. 1975). For a more 
in-depth discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Act and how it relates to tribal 
courts, see generally Smith, supra note 81. For a more in-depth discussion of 
the Full Faith and Credit Act, see infra Part II.A.1.b.ii. 
 123. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) (finding that the 
term “Territories and Possessions” was “broad enough to include Indian tribes, 
at least as they are presently constituted under the laws of the United States”). 
 124. Id. at 901 (“Tribal court decrees, while not precisely equivalent to de-
crees of the courts of sister states, are nevertheless entitled to full faith and 
credit.”). 
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However, in 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Shep-
pard in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson.125 In overruling Shep-
pard, the Idaho Supreme Court followed Ninth Circuit case law 
that held tribes are not entitled to full faith and credit pursuant 
to the Full Faith and Credit Act because “[n]othing in debates of 
the Constitutional Convention concerning the [Full Faith and 
Credit] clause indicates the framers thought the clause would 
apply to Indian tribes.”126 Now tribal court orders are only af-
forded deference via judicial comity in Idaho.127 Even though 
Idaho no longer provides full faith and credit to tribal court or-
ders, it still serves as an example of a state being willing to ex-
tend full faith and credit to tribal court orders. Despite the lack 
of states giving full faith and credit to tribal court orders, there 
are many sound arguments in support of extending it to tribes. 
b. Reasons to Give Tribal Court Orders Full Faith and Credit 
i. The Reality of Tribes in America and the Will of Congress 
As was seen in the Jim and Sheppard cases, courts have 
been willing to extend full faith and credit to tribal court orders 
by finding that the Full Faith and Credit Act applies to tribal 
nations.128 
Most scholarship argues that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, via the Full Faith and Credit 
Act, requires states and the federal government to give full faith 
and credit to tribal court judgments.129 The crux of this approach 
centers around the realities of how tribes function in the United 
States, the goals of the Full Faith and Credit Act, and the com-
plex history of federal American Indian policy.130 
 
 125. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13, 16–17 (Idaho 2017). 
 126. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 127. Johnson, 405 P.3d at 17. The Idaho Supreme Court also clarified that 
they were not overruling Sheppard in its entirety. Id. (“We will continue to ap-
ply [Sheppard’s] requirement that a party attacking the validity of a tribal 
court’s judgment bears the burden of proving its invalidity.” (citing Sheppard, 
655 P.2d at 901)). 
 128. See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
 129. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 81, at 1393–95, 1427–32 (providing an over-
view of scholarship in the former page range, while the second page range ad-
vances the position that the Full Faith and Credit Act requires the federal gov-
ernment and state governments to extend full faith and credit to tribal court 
orders). 
 130. Id. at 1427. See supra Part I.A.1 for an overview of the complex and 
convoluted history of Indian policy in the United States. See supra Part I.A.3 
for a better look at the realities of how tribes function in the United States; how 
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Congress has enacted a multitude of laws that apply to 
tribes—many of which have shaped tribal courts into judicial en-
tities that resemble American courts.131 The goal of these enact-
ments has been to increase the economic, social, and political in-
teractions between tribes and the United States.132 The increase 
in interactions between sovereigns makes tribal governments “a 
critical element of the American political reality and our system 
of government.”133 Given this, extending full faith and credit to 
tribes will further increase interaction between the sovereigns 
and embrace the reality that the sovereigns are more akin to sis-
ters.134 
ii. Breaking down the Full Faith and Credit Act 
As some commentators have noted, applying the Indian 
canon135 to the Full Faith and Credit Act, it is reasonable to in-
terpret the statute as applying to tribes because the statute is 
ambiguous as to whether it applies to tribes.136 The goal of the 
Full Faith and Credit Act is to provide “for the orderly admin-
istration of justice throughout the United States.”137 The argu-
ment is that extending full faith and credit to tribal court orders 
furthers the goal of the Act by providing finality to judicial deci-
sions that have already been litigated, and eliminates the delay 
created by petitioning a state court to recognize and enforce an 
order.138 Interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Act as applying 
 
tribes function in the United States can be gleaned from understanding the sta-
tus of tribal sovereignty and the jurisdiction tribal judicial systems have. 
 131. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 132. See Smith, supra note 81, at 1430 (arguing that increased Congres-
sional oversight during the past century has resulted in greater control of the 
American society and, with it, Indian tribes). 
 133. Id. (asserting that it is beyond dispute that tribes are a key component 
to the American political reality). 
 134. Id. 
 135. The Indian canon is a tool of statutory construction employed by judges 
that instructs them to settle statutory ambiguity in favor of tribes. See Philip P. 
Frickey, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100–01 (2013) 
(explaining that because so many of the early American dealings with tribes 
were inherently one-sided and exploitive, this doctrine emerges from the idea 
that texts should be read in the way the tribes would have understood them to 
mean at the time of their ratification or enactment). 
 136. Smith, supra note 81, at 1427–28 (analyzing the arguments of both 
sides of the ambiguity debate under the Indian canon). 
 137. Id. at 1430. 
 138. Id. 
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to tribes is consistent with current federal Indian policy of re-
specting tribal courts.139 This interpretation would accomplish 
two things: (1) continue the growth and development of tribal 
courts by helping legitimize the courts in the eyes of Anglo-
American litigants who may be more inclined to use tribal courts 
as a judicial forum; and (2) “increase the prestige of tribal courts 
by preventing state courts from ignoring tribal court judgments 
at their discretion.”140 
A final point to address regarding the Full Faith and Credit 
Act is the fact that the Act’s language seems to indicate that 
tribes are required to give state court judgments full faith and 
credit regardless of whether tribal court judgments are extended 
full faith and credit. The relevant part of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 reads: 
“[State] Acts, records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the 
same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States.”141 As the Supreme Court found in U.S. v. Wheeler, tribes 
are “physically within the territory of the United States . . . .”142 
Accordingly, a strict reading of § 1738 leads to the conclusion 
that tribes are to give full faith and credit to state court judg-
ments because tribal courts are located within the United States. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Shepard focused on 
this language and ruled that tribes owe full faith and credit to 
Idaho court decisions.143 This interpretation of the Full Faith 
and Credit Act can be used to support arguments that tribes 
should be treated as a territory under the Act. Here, “territories” 
is ambiguous because tribal lands are in the United States, 
therefore making them a territory, so a court should apply the 
Indian canon and interpret the term in favor of tribes.144 This 
“should result in tribes being owed full faith and credit, since to 
hold otherwise would be to deny them the benefit of full faith and 
credit while imposing the burden on them.”145 
 
 139. See generally CLINTON ET AL., supra note 25 (arguing that interpreting 
the Full Faith and Credit Act as applying to tribes is consistent with federal 
Indian policy). 
 140. Smith, supra note 81, at 1431. 
 141. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018). 
 142. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). 
 143. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 n.2 (1982). Because Sheppard 
was functionally (if not directly) overruled less than a year prior to this writing, 
it is unclear whether the Idaho Supreme Court still holds this position. 
 144. It should be noted that “territory” is not defined in the Full Faith and 
Credit Act. 
 145. Smith, supra note 81, at 1407 n.85. 
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iii. Increased Interaction 
Moving beyond arguments in the context of the Full Faith 
and Credit Act, in Sheppard v. Sheppard, the Idaho Supreme 
Court was right to believe that extending full faith and credit to 
tribal court orders would facilitate better relations between the 
tribal courts in Idaho and the state courts of Idaho.146 Fostering 
a positive relationship between state and tribal governments 
leads to more efficient administration of justice and increases 
tribal sovereignty and the legitimacy of tribal courts.147 
An example of such a relationship is the execution of a Joint 
Powers Agreement between the Leech Lake Tribal Court and the 
Cass County District Court.148 The Agreement was made in re-
sponse to the severe alcohol and drug abuse issues plaguing both 
communities and ultimately led to the creation of the Leech 
Lake-Cass County Wellness Court.149 The Wellness Court was 
the first problem-solving court of its kind in the nation.150 The 
goal of the Wellness Court was to make sure that public safety 
is protected, that people get the help they need, and to improve 
the quality of life for all in the community.151 The Leech Lake 
Tribal Court and the Cass County District Court worked to-
gether to accomplish these goals, and judges from both courts 
presided over hearings together.152 The Wellness Court even al-
ternated between holding hearings in tribal courtrooms and dis-
trict court courtrooms.153 “This ground-breaking agreement al-
lows the Courts to more effectively and efficiently achieve their 
mutual goals of improving access to justice; administering jus-
tice for effective results; and fostering public trust, accountabil-
ity, and impartiality.”154 Involvement of the Leech Lake Tribal 
Court in the Agreement “brought unprecedented recognition not 
only for the [tribal court], but also for tribal sovereignty in gen-
eral.”155 The Wellness Court serves as an example of the positive 
 
 146. Sheppard, 655 P.2d at 902; see also, e.g., Smith, supra note 81, at 1394 
(asserting that the extension of full faith and credit to tribal court orders will 
lead to better relations between tribal, state, and federal courts). 
 147. Wahwassuck, supra note 14, at 755. 
 148. Id. at 747. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 748. 
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results that can occur when tribes and states work together. By 
extending full faith and credit to tribal court orders, litigants are 
more likely to choose tribal courts as their judicial forum and 
there will be more positive communication between the sover-
eigns due to the likely increase in orders being recognized. It is 
that increase in positive interaction that can lead to the best out-
comes for both tribal and state governments. 
iv. Extending Full Faith and Credit to Tribal Court Orders 
Will Help Clarify Tribal Sovereignty and Prevent the Wrongful 
Denial of Tribal Court Orders that are Required to be Enforced 
by Statute 
Another strong argument for giving full faith and credit to 
tribal court orders is that doing so will help clarify the status of 
tribal sovereignty, which will in turn help clarify where tribal 
governments fit in the American federal system.156 By establish-
ing full faith and credit for tribal court orders, states can help 
ensure that justice under the law is maintained. If tribal court 
orders are enforced just as orders from another state are, it will 
prevent individuals who have a tribal judgment leveled against 
them from simply fleeing the jurisdiction or engaging in forum 
shopping by re-litigating the issue in a state district court.157 
Lastly, one of the most significant problems that exists in 
states that use comity instead of full faith and credit is that 
many tribal court orders are wrongfully denied.158 There is a 
startling lack of empirical data regarding the recognition and en-
forcement of tribal court orders, but one commentator conducted 
a survey that found fifty-six percent of tribal judges who re-
sponded to the survey had had at least one order that another 
 
 156. Smith, supra note 81, at 1435 (arguing that providing tribal courts full 
faith and credit “will advance the cause of tribal sovereignty while acknowledg-
ing and respecting the legitimacy of tribal practices and institutions in Ameri-
can life”). 
 157. Id. at 1404; see also Tim Vollmann, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian 
Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants’ Rights in Conflict, 22 KAN. L. REV. 
387, 406 (1974) (explaining that because tribes are a separate sovereign, collat-
eral estoppel does not apply to situations like this).  
 158. See, e.g., Leeds, supra note 95, at 349 (covering statistics regarding the 
recognition of tribal court orders in district courts). Even though this data is 
useful to illustrate that state courts refusing to recognize and enforce tribal 
court orders is a problem, the data would not pass as scientifically reliable. Re-
spondents were self-selected, and the response rate was approximately thirty-
four percent, and the results provide no information regarding why an order 
was refused. Id. at 348. Accordingly, the data should be approached with cau-
tion and any generalizations drawn should bear this in mind. 
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jurisdiction refused to enforce.159 Of the reported refusals, eighty 
percent happened in a state court, while the other twenty per-
cent happened in another tribal court.160 The most significant 
finding from the survey was that forty percent of the refusals 
that happened in state courts were wrongfully denied.161 These 
wrongful denials involved subject matters specifically covered by 
an explicit federal full faith and credit command statute, such as 
the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act.162 While 
it is not a guarantee that extending full faith and credit would 
lead to all tribal court orders being enforced, it is sure to mitigate 
instances of judges abusing their discretion under the auspice of 
judicial comity and would make it much harder for judges to cir-
cumvent the recognition and enforcement of tribal court orders. 
2. Judicial Comity: The Middle and Low End of the Spectrum 
The rationales for affording tribal court judgments a moder-
ate or low level of deference are similar. The rationales for why 
one state chooses to give more or less deference under the doc-
trine of comity are not clear, but some factors may include the 
inherent (mis)trust the state has in tribal courts as a competent 
judicial forum and the working relationship that exists between 
the sovereigns. The arguments in support of recognizing and en-
forcing tribal court orders via comity will be covered simultane-
ously, given that they apply to both middle and low levels on the 
deference spectrum. The difference between moderate and low 
levels of deference is slight. In a moderate deference jurisdiction, 
there is a presumption of enforcement; in a low deference juris-
diction, there is no presumption. A low deference jurisdiction 
typically places the burden of proving enforceability on the per-
son seeking enforcement and gives judges broad discretion in 
coming to their ruling. 
a. Moderate Level of Deference 
Oklahoma is a state that provides a moderate amount of def-
erence to tribal court orders. In 1992, the Oklahoma legislature 
passed legislation that used the phrase “full faith and credit” to 
 
 159. Id. at 349 n.245 (fifteen out of twenty-seven respondents reported re-
fusals). 
 160. Id. at 349 n.246 (twelve tribal courts reported state court refusals, and 
three tribes reported refusals by other tribal courts). 
 161. Id. at 349. 
 162. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2018). 
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describe the treatment of tribal court orders in the state, but the 
statute goes on to establish a level of deference that gives less 
respect to tribal court decisions compared to other states.163 The 
statute states: 
A. This act affirms the power of the Supreme Court of the State of Ok-
lahoma to issue standards for extending full faith and credit to the rec-
ords and judicial proceedings of any court of any federally recognized 
Indian nation, tribe, band or political subdivision thereof, including 
courts of Indian offenses. 
B. In issuing any such standard the Supreme Court of the State of Ok-
lahoma may extend such recognition in whole or in part to such type or 
types of judgments of the tribal courts as it deems appropriate where 
tribal courts agree to grant reciprocity of judgments of the courts of the 
State of Oklahoma in such tribal courts.164 
By granting the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma 
the power to extend full faith and credit as they see fit, the Ok-
lahoma statute is more in line with judicial comity than it is full 
faith and credit. When the Oklahoma Supreme Court exercises 
its power given by the statute, a state court must recognize and 
enforce a tribal court judgment if (1) “the tribal court that issued 
the judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of the courts of the 
State of Oklahoma,”165 (2) “the court rendering the judgment 
[had] jurisdiction,”166 and (3) extrinsic fraud was not used to ob-
tain the tribal court judgment.167 There is a presumption that 
the tribal court order will be enforced.168 Multiple states legisla-
tures and even some courts erroneously claim to afford tribal 
court orders full faith and credit, but in reality they are giving 
deference via judicial comity.169 The result is that Oklahoma 
uses comity to determine the level of deference afforded tribal 
court orders, but still gives more deference than other states, 
given its presumption of enforcement and the limited number of 
factors a district court can consider when deciding whether to 
recognize the order. 
 
 163. Washburn & Thompson, supra note 16, at 483 n.17. 
 164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (1992). 
 165. OKLA. ST. DIST. CTS. RULE 30(B) (2011). 
 166. Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 1994) (citation omitted). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. In addition to Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Wyoming are examples of 
states erroneously using the label of full faith and credit to describe the mecha-
nism and level of deference given to tribal court orders. See, e.g., Smith, supra 
note 81, at 1434 n.267 (citing the relevant statutes in Oklahoma, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming). 
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Alaska is another example of a moderate amount of defer-
ence afforded to tribal court judgments. In Alaska, a district 
court is required to recognize and enforce tribal court judgments 
unless “the tribal court lacked personal or subject matter juris-
diction” or “any litigant is denied due process.”170 Given that a 
district court in Alaska is “required” to recognize and enforce 
tribal court judgments, that sounds a lot like full faith and credit. 
However, because a district court can consider specific factors, 
Alaska does not grant full faith and credit; rather, it is a comity 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Alaska confirmed this asser-
tion when they stated that Alaska courts should “respect tribal 
court decisions under the comity doctrine.”171 Just as in Okla-
homa, the presumption of enforcement and the limited factors a 
judge can deny enforcement of a tribal court order on result in a 
moderate level of deference for tribal court orders. 
b. Low Level of Deference: Minnesota’s Old Rule 
Minnesota’s previous rule governing the recognition and en-
forcement of tribal court orders was an example of the lowest 
level of deference given to tribal court orders. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court established Rule 10 of the Minnesota General Rules 
of Practice to control the level of deference afforded tribal court 
orders.172 Rule 10 was divided into two sub rules: Rule 10.01 and 
Rule 10.02.173 
Rule 10.01 controlled when a tribal court order had to be 
given effect because “recognition [was] mandated by law.”174 
Rule 10.01(a) mandated that if a state or federal statute requires 
a tribal court order be given effect, courts must do so.175 The Ad-
visory Committee notes on the rule listed some state and federal 
statutes that had to be followed, but the specific statutes were 
not found in the text of the rule itself.176 Rule 10.01(b) mandated 
that “[w]here an applicable state or federal statute establishes a 
procedure for enforcement of any tribal court order or judgment, 
 
 170. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999). 
 171. Id. 
 172. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10 (2004) (repealed 2018). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. MINN. GEN. R. P. 10.01(a) (2004) (repealed 2018) (“Where mandated by 
state or federal statute, orders, judgments, and other judicial acts of the tribal 
courts of any federally recognized Indian tribe shall be recognized and en-
forced.”). 
 176. Id. 
  
2019] THE LAST JUDICIAL FRONTIER 1631 
 
 
that procedure must be followed.”177 Rule 10.01 also established 
that a tribal court order pertaining to the Violence Against 
Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2003), was presumed to be en-
forceable.178 
Rule 10.02 was more problematic. Rule 10.02(a) established 
that if a tribal court order was not enforceable under Rule 10.01, 
the enforcement of the tribal judgment was purely discretion-
ary.179 Rule 10.02 provided ten factors that a state court “may” 
consider when making their decision.180 Some of these factors in-
cluded whether there was adequate notice to the party against 
whom enforcement was sought, and whether the tribal court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction.181 In the end, the factors did not 
mean much, if anything, in light of the final factor, which al-
lowed a state court to consider “any other factors the court deems 
appropriate in the interest of justice.”182 Under the old Rule 
10.02(b), the tribal court or the individual seeking enforcement 
of the tribal court judgment was not entitled to a hearing on the 
matter, which further reduced the level of deference afforded to 
tribal courts.183 Above all else, the discretionary nature of the 
previous version of Rule 10 in Minnesota made it fall on the low 
side of the deference spectrum. 
c. Why Many States Prefer Judicial Comity Over Full Faith 
and Credit 
Proponents of restricting deference to tribal court orders in-
clude state and federal judges and, surprisingly, tribal courts 
themselves. The most common argument advanced in support of 
restricting the deference given to tribal court orders is that tribal 
courts are legal bodies that lack the competency, sophistication, 
and resources to be trusted.184 Given the supposed lack of com-
 
 177. MINN. GEN. R. P. 10.01(b) (2004) (repealed 2018). 
 178. Id. 
 179. MINN. GEN. R. P. 10.02(a) (2004) (repealed 2018). 
 180. Id. 
 181. For the complete list of factors, see id. 
 182. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10.02(a)(10) (2004) (repealed 2018). 
 183. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10.02(b) (2004) (repealed 2018) (“The court shall 
hold such hearing, if any, as it deems necessary under the circumstances.”). 
 184. Cf. Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Amendments to the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts 
No. AD-M09-8009, at 1 (filed Jan. 19, 2018) (on file with author) (noting that 
the 2003 proposed Minnesota rule regarding the recognition and enforcement 
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petence, state courts should be cautious when deciding to recog-
nize and enforce a tribal court order. The only way that caution 
can be exercised is by allowing judges to have discretion in de-
ciding whether to enforce orders. Discretion in the context of en-
forcing a tribal court judgement can only be exercised under the 
doctrine of judicial comity—not under a full faith and credit 
mandate.185 
When the previous version of Rule 10 of the Minnesota Gen-
eral Rules of Practice was promulgated in 2003, there was con-
cern regarding the competency of tribal courts.186 These same 
arguments were brought forth again in opposition to the recent 
amendment to Rule 10.187 These concerns are difficult to pin 
down because they are only supported by anecdotal evidence.188 
To the contrary, tribal courts in Minnesota and around the coun-
try have invested significant resources into their judicial sys-
tems.189 Tribal judges hold law degrees from some of the best law 
schools in the country and many have practiced outside of tribal 
courts.190 
One of the strongest arguments for comity comes from the 
perspective of tribes themselves. Given tribal government sover-
eignty, comity is the only means by which tribal court orders can 
 
of tribal court orders was met with public opposition that centered primarily on 
concerns about the efficacy of tribal courts). 
 185. See supra Part I.B (explaining that comity allows discretion, while full 
faith and credit does not). 
 186. Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum, supra note 184.  
 187. See, e.g., Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Comment on to [sic] 
Petition to Amend Rule 10, at 1–2, http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/ 
media/Tribal-Orders/Mille-Lacs-County-Attorney-Comment.pdf (expressing op-
position to the 2018 Amendment to Rule 10 on grounds that can be equated to 
tribal courts lacking competency). 
 188. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 45:00, Proposed Amendments to the Gen. 
Rules of Practice for the Dist. Courts (Mar. 14, 2018) (No. AD-M09-8009), http:// 
www.mncourts.gov/SupremeCourt/OralArgumentWebcasts/ArgumentDetail 
.aspx?vid=1193 (depicting Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Barry Anderson 
explaining that concerns regarding the efficacy of tribal courts are only sup-
ported by anecdotal evidence). Justice Anderson also pointed out the fact that 
there had been little to no opposition to the proposed changes and there had 
been overwhelming support for the Amendment. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe Tribal Court, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Amendments to the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts 
No. AD-M09-8009, at 1 (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/ 
media/Tribal-Orders/Leech-Lake-Band-of-Ojbwe-Tribal-Court-Comment.pdf 
(describing how the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe invested seven million dollars 
into a new Judicial Center). 
 190. Id.; see also O’Connor, supra note 11, at 2. 
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be given effect in state courts without degrading their sovereign 
status.191 The rationale behind this position is that full faith and 
credit presumes that when full faith and credit is extended to 
another sovereign, they are brought closer together as one na-
tion.192 Tribes may not want to be seen as one nation with the 
United States because their sovereignty pre-dates the United 
States.193 Therefore, to maintain their unique sovereignty, com-
ity should be the mechanism that states use to decide whether 
they want to enforce tribal court judgments.194 The crux of this 
argument is that comity, not full faith and credit, bolsters tribal 
sovereignty.195 
Lastly, tribal court orders are not easily accessible to prac-
ticing attorneys.196 Access to published tribal court opinions is 
limited on research platforms such as Westlaw.197 This poses 
some issues because practitioners are not able to readily conduct 
research to ensure that they best represent their clients’ inter-
ests. The argument that follows is that if attorneys are not able 
to best represent their clients’ interests in tribal courts, review-
ing courts should have the discretion to evaluate whether the 
interest of the party was adequately represented. This is a fair 
argument of which tribal courts should take note. Publishing 
opinions, especially on an electronic database, will provide all 
persons with better access to the tribal courts. Given that each 
tribe has their own inherent sovereign authority, the publication 
of tribal court records will vary from tribe to tribe.198 
 
 191. Smith, supra note 81, at 1433–34. 
 192. See supra Part I.B.1.a (discussing full faith and credit). 
 193. Smith, supra note 81, at 1433–34. 
 194. Id. 
 195. But see supra Part II.A.1.b (arguing that full faith and credit enhances 
tribal sovereignty and judicial comity degrades it). 
 196. Randy V. Thompson, Response by Randy V. Thompson to Supplemental 
Information Request regarding Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judg-
ments, at 8–9 (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/ 
Tribal-Orders/Supplemental%20Hearing%20Submissions/Thompson-04-24 
-2017-Supplemental-Response-FINAL.pdf. 
 197. Cf. id. (explaining that tribal court opinions are published by tribal 
courts). 
 198. Charles Vig et al., Response by the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Com-
munity, the Lower Sioux Indian Community, the Upper Sioux Community, and 
the Prairie Island Indian Community to Supplemental Information Request re-
garding Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments, at 8 (Apr. 
24, 2017), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Tribal-Orders/ 
Supplemental%20Hearing%20Submissions/SMSC-LSIC-USC-PIIC 
-Supplemental-Filing-to-Rule-10-Petition-final.pdf. 
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B. MINNESOTA’S RECENT CHANGE: THE PETITION TO AMEND 
RULE 10 AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 
On November 30, 2016, the Minnesota Tribal Court/State 
Court Forum (“the Forum”) submitted a petition to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court to amend Rule 10 of the Minnesota General 
Rules of Practice for the District Courts.199 The Forum is com-
prised of tribal judges from each tribal court in Minnesota, 
judges from the Minnesota state courts, and attorneys.200 The 
Amendment proposed a total overhaul of Rule 10 of the Minne-
sota General Rules of Practice.201 The Forum’s petition repre-
sented the culmination two decades of work.202 On July 2, 2018, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a new rule that gives a 
moderate amount of deference to tribal court orders.203 This Sec-
tion covers the brief historical development of the rule in Minne-
sota and gives an overview of the recent changes promulgated by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.  
Prior to 2004, Minnesota did not have a rule in place that 
governed the recognition and enforcement of tribal court or-
ders.204 Around 2000, the Forum started working on a proposal 
for a rule focused on the recognition of tribal court orders.205 Af-
ter years of work and multiple drafts of the rule, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court finally adopted Rule 10 and it became effective 
on January 1, 2004.206 Some commentators at the time criticized 
Rule 10 for not giving enough respect to tribal courts.207 How-
ever, the rule was still an important first step to giving tribal 
courts the respect they deserve because it established procedures 
 
 199. See generally Petition of the Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Fo-
rum, In Re Petition to Amend Rule 10 of the Minn. Gen. Rules of Practice for 
the District of Minn. No. AD-M09-8009 (Nov. 30, 2016) [hereinafter The Amend-
ment], http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Tribal-Orders/Forum 
-Petition-filed-Nov-30-2016.pdf (explaining the Amendment and noting that it 
was filed on Nov. 3, 2018).  
 200. Id. ¶ 1. 
 201. Id. ¶¶ 41–71. 
 202. RITA COYLE DEMEULES, OVERVIEW: 2003 AND 2011 PETITIONS TO 
AMEND COURT RULES TO RECOGNIZE TRIBAL COURT JUDGMENTS 1 n.1 (Jan. 3, 
2016), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Tribal-Orders/Memo-to 
-MHC-re-tribal-court-judgments-170106.pdf [hereinafter Rule 10 History] (not-
ing that the Forum was created in 1996). 
 203. See Rule 10 Order, supra note 1, at 1. 
 204. See Rule 10 History, supra note 202, at 1. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. See generally Washburn & Thompson, supra note 16 (critiquing the pre-
vious version of Rule 10 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice). 
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for how a tribal court order could be recognized in Minnesota 
state courts. 
Even though Rule 10 was an important first step, over the 
years since its promulgation, its problems became evident.208 
The Amendment proposed by the Forum in 2016 sought to ad-
dress these problems,209 and the overhauled Rule 10 promul-
gated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2018, largely reflects 
the proposed changes. The changes to Rule 10 became effective 
on September 1, 2018.210  
As the proposed changes were considered by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, many people expressed their opinions regarding 
the changes.211 The new rule remains a rule of comity, but it does 
establish a presumption of enforcement.212 As explained below, 
the rule clarifies procedures for enforcement and provides more 
guidance to district court judges by eliminating the broad discre-
tion judges had under the previous version of the rule. 
1. Rule 10.01: Mandatory Recognition 
The new Rule 10.01 remains largely the same as the previ-
ous version. However, the Rule has been reframed and further 
clarifies when a tribal court order is required to be recognized. 
Several statutory references from the Advisory Committee com-
ments have now been moved into the body of the rule, such as 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911.213 In addition, 
two new statutory citations were added to the list of laws man-
dating recognition of tribal court orders and judgments.214 The 
changes clarify the language of Rule 10.01 and help guide the 
district courts’ decisions by identifying specific laws that man-
date recognition of tribal court judgments and orders. 
 
 208. As was previously discussed, the previous version of Rule 10 created 
delays in the recognition and enforcement of tribal court orders. See, e.g., Leeds, 
supra note 95, at 349 (discussing statistics regarding the denial of tribal court 
orders where recognition and enforcement is mandated). 
 209. See The Amendment, supra note 199, ¶ 39. 
 210. See Rule 10 Order, supra note 1, at 2. 
 211. Memorandum in Support of Order Promulgating Amendments to the 
Gen. Rules of Practice for the Dist. Courts, No. ADM09-8009, at 2 (Minn. July 
2, 2018), http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ctrack/docket/docketEntry.do? 
action=edit&deID=978702&csNameID=66710&csInstanceID=72760&csIID= 
72760 (follow “Administrative - Order - Other (Corrected)” hyperlink). 
 212. Id. at 6. 
 213. Id. at 3. 
 214. Id. (adding 25 U.S.C. § 3106 and 25 U.S.C. § 3713). 
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a. Rule 10.02: Civil-Commitment Proceedings 
Rule 10.02 was completely rewritten to focus specifically on 
the recognition of tribal court orders and judgments governing 
civil-commitment proceedings.215 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
found persuasive the Advisory Committee’s recommendation 
that a specific rule was needed to govern the recognition of tribal 
civil commitment orders.216 The Court noted “the mental-health 
and financial issues that may . . . be of concern in [these] pro-
ceedings favor adopting a separate rule that provides specific 
guidance to the district courts.”217 The updated Rule identifies 
the circumstances that require enforcement of civil-commitment 
orders entered by certain tribal courts, or the circumstances in 
which the enforcement determination will be made under the 
new discretionary-recognition rule, Rule 10.03, discussed be-
low.218 
b. Rule 10.03: Discretionary-Recognition 
Rule 10.03 is now the discretionary-recognition rule that 
was previously found in Rule 10.02. The new rule specifies that 
a party seeking enforcement of a tribal court order needs to pro-
ceed by petition or a motion within an existing action.219 Going 
back to Steven and his custody dispute from the introduction to 
this Note, under this rule, Steven could have simply petitioned 
the court to recognize the tribal court order. Steven would not 
need an existing cause of action to be able to petition the court. 
Instead of the burden of proving that the order should be recog-
nized being placed on the party seeking enforcement, the burden 
is now on the party whom enforcement is being sought 
against.220 Additionally, a presumption of enforcement is estab-
lished if the party is not able to carry its burden.221 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the catchall 
factor found in the previous version of the rule “effectively swal-
lowed the rule.”222 Accordingly, the catchall factor was deleted 
and the list of ten factors has now been reduced to five: (1) the 
 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. at 3–4.  
 219. Id. at 4–5. 
 220. Id. at 5. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
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order or judgment is invalid on its face or no longer remains in 
effect; (2) the tribal court lacked personal or subject-matter ju-
risdiction; (3) the affected party was not afforded due process 
rights; (4) the order or judgment was obtained by fraud, duress, 
or coercion; or (5) the tribal court does not reciprocally recognize 
and enforce orders, judgments and decrees of the courts of Min-
nesota.223 This effectively removes the unbridled discretion 
judges previously had, while maintaining the rule as one of com-
ity.224 
Of importance is the Supreme Court’s justifications for re-
ducing and clarifying the relevant factors to enforcement. First, 
the changes to the rule will help lead to more consistent out-
comes.225 Lastly, “the presumptive-recognition language is a 
more robust acknowledgement of the independent sovereignty of 
the Tribal Nations that have established tribal courts . . . .”226 
Overall, the changes to Rule 10 are, yet again, another im-
portant step towards showing tribal courts the respect they de-
serve. However, the changes still fail to adequately address all 
the issue that existed under the previous Rule 10. The simple 
fact that the Rule 10.03 remains one of comity and there are spe-
cific factors that a judge can consider could continue to lead to 
delays in enforcement. It is also important to note that Rule 
10.03 does not establish and outright presumption of enforce-
ment. Rather, there is only a presumption of enforcement when 
the party against whom the order is sought fails to demonstrate 
that the order should not be enforced. This demonstrates that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court continues to approach tribal 
courts with caution instead of embracing them as an equally 
qualified judicial body. Accordingly, the rule does little to clarify 
tribal sovereignty or where tribal courts fit into the judicial 
framework of the United States. 
Many states have made changes over the past decade that 
afford more deference to tribal courts.227 This historical develop-
 
 223. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 10.3(c) (2018). 
 224. Memorandum in Support of Order Promulgating Amendments to the 
Gen. Rules of Practice for the Dist. Courts, No. ADM09-8009, at 5 (Minn. July 
2, 2018), http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ctrack/docket/docketEntry.do? 
action=edit&deID=978702&csNameID=66710&csInstanceID=72760&csIID= 
72760 (follow “Administrative - Order - Other (Corrected)” hyperlink). 
 225. Id. 
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 227. See The Amendment, supra note 199, ¶¶ 52–62 (discussing examples of 
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ment of Rule 10 in Minnesota is important to understand be-
cause it illustrates where this area of the law is heading: toward 
affording tribal court judgments more deference.228 As Kevin 
Washburn stated in a letter written in support of the 2018 
Amendment, “[The] proposed amendments represent progress. 
The proposed amendments offer a significant step in the right 
direction . . . .”229 What this means is that even though the Min-
nesota Supreme Court adopted significant changes to Rule 10, 
there is still room for improvement. This Note’s proposal repre-
sents where that progress is striving to get to—affording tribal 
court orders full faith and credit in state courts. 
III.  STATE LEGISLATURES SHOULD ADOPT AN 
AMENDMENT TO THEIR STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
EXTENDING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO TRIBAL 
COURT JUDGMENTS   
Using judicial comity to determine whether a tribal court 
order should be recognized and enforced in state courts contin-
ues the oppression and colonialism Native Americans have faced 
for hundreds of years under the guise of being respectful and 
deferential. Accordingly, extension of full faith and credit is pre-
ferred over judicial comity. This Note argues that state legisla-
tures should amend their state constitutions to give full faith 
and credit to tribal court orders.230 This Part begins by explain-
ing why a constitutional amendment is preferable over other ju-
dicial or legislative action and is followed by a discussion of the 
challenges this proposal may provoke. Lastly, counterarguments 
are considered. 
A. WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS THE BEST WAY TO 
EXTEND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO TRIBAL COURT ORDERS 
As noted previously, there are two ways that full faith and 
credit can be extended to tribal court orders: (1) judicial action 
and (2) legislative action.231 There have only been two examples 
 
states giving more deference to tribal courts). 
 228. See id. 
 229. Kevin Washburn, Comment Letter on Amendment to Rule 10 of The 
Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts No. AD-M09-8009, 
at 3 (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Tribal 
-Orders/Professor-Kevin-Washburn-Comment.pdf. 
 230. The amendment should specify that it applies to all federally recognized 
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of states extending full faith and credit to tribal court orders. 
Both were through judicial action, and only one is still in force 
today; the other was overturned by a subsequent court decision. 
There is yet to be a state that extends full faith and credit to 
tribal court orders through legislative action.232 
Legislative action is preferable to judicial action because leg-
islative action is inherently more stable. One need not look fur-
ther than the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision to overturn its pre-
vious decision to extend full faith and credit to tribal court 
orders. The stability of legislative action is particularly true in 
the context of a constitutional amendment. For example, in Min-
nesota, a constitutional amendment needs to be approved by a 
simple majority of both chambers of the legislature and then be 
ratified by a simple majority of voters at the next general elec-
tion.233 This same process would apply to overturning the 
amendment after it is passed. Once the constitution is amended, 
it will take much more than a panel of judges to decide the state 
no longer wishes to extend full faith and credit to tribal court 
orders. 
A constitutional amendment is also preferable because it 
communicates the will of the people more than a judicial action. 
Minnesota’s requirement that voters approve the amendment 
ensures that citizens are involved in the decision. Extending full 
faith and credit to tribal court orders in this way allows Minne-
sota voters to directly communicate to tribal governments and 
members: “We want to respect your rights as a sovereign nation.” 
Even in states where citizens do not vote on constitutional 
amendments, the legislators communicate the same message, 
because they are elected by the people and speak on behalf of the 
electorate. This in turn leads to the positive impact of good rela-
tions between tribes and states. As discussed in Part II, in-
creased relations and positive interactions leads to more efficient 
and effective administration of justice that is beneficial for all. 
Next, a constitutional amendment extending full faith and 
credit to tribal court judgments is preferable over judicial action 
because it is unclear whether a state supreme court can extend 
full faith and credit to tribal court orders.234 The two cases where 
 
 232. There have been states that claim to give full faith and credit to tribal 
court orders via statute, but, as was discussed supra Part II.A.2.a., these stat-
utes use the label of full faith and credit incorrectly when in reality the statute 
extends deference through comity. Supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 233. MINN. CONST. art. IX. 
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a court extended full faith and credit to tribal court judgments 
did so by interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Act, a federal 
statute, as applying to tribes. This Note does not advance that 
position. A court is not able to simply rule that full faith and 
credit should be extended to tribal courts without finding a basis 
in the law that would allow them to rule in such a way.235 The 
only “rulings” that a court may promulgate that are not predi-
cated on a set of specific facts are procedural rules designed to 
control the litigation process.236 Rule 10 of the Minnesota Gen-
eral Rules of Practice is an example of a procedural rule.237 A 
court is not able to create substantive rights.238 Only a legislative 
body has the authority to create substantive rights.239 “[S]ub-
stantive rights [are] rights ‘granted for one or more nonproce-
dural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do 
with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.’”240 A 
mandate of full faith and credit would certainly be regarded as 
creating a substantive right because it would creating, defining, 
and regulating the right to have tribal court orders enforced 
without question.241 Therefore, by the state legislature adopting 
a constitutional amendment, it ensures that the proper author-
ity is being exercised. The distinction between a substantive 
right and a procedural rule becomes irrelevant in this context if 
full faith and credit is extended to tribal court orders via a state 
constitutional amendment. 
 
the General Rules of Practice for the District Courts No. ADM09-8009, at D-1 
to D-3 (Minn. July 2, 2018) [hereinafter Memorandum Gildea Dissent] (Gildea 
J., dissenting), http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ctrack/docket/docketEntry 
.do?action=edit&deID=978702&csNameID=66710&csInstanceID=72760& 
csIID=72760 (follow “Administrative – Order – Other (Corrected)” hyperlink). 
 235. See id. 
 236. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and 
the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 26, 36 (2008). 
 237. Rule 10 is procedural because it simply provides for the process in which 
a tribal court order recognized in Minnesota District courts. 
 238. Cf. Redish & Murashko, supra note 236 (explaining that courts can only 
make procedural rules). 
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 240. Id. at 36 (quoting John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 
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cent amendment to Rule 10 creates a substantive right). 
  
2019] THE LAST JUDICIAL FRONTIER 1641 
 
 
Building off the distinction between a substantive and pro-
cedural right, the only way that judicial action could extend full 
faith and credit to tribal court orders is by interpreting the Full 
Faith and Credit Act as applying to tribes. Extending full faith 
and credit to tribal court orders via the Full Faith and Credit Act 
has the potential to create a slippery slope. The Full Faith and 
Credit Act is a generally applicable statute.242 Interpreting the 
Act as applying to tribes would open the door for the argument 
to be made that other generally applicable statutes should apply 
to tribes. Based on the already muddled and confusing network 
of laws and policies that are applicable to tribes, applying more 
laws to tribes is likely to add confusion. Further, if tribes are 
considered a “territory” of the United States, that would rid them 
of the unique sovereignty they enjoy.243 Overall, a state consti-
tutional mandate of full faith and credit is preferable because 
the decision will be more stable, it communicates the will of the 
people more effectively, there are no separation of powers issues, 
and tribes will retain their unique sovereignty.  
B. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES AND COUNTERARGUMENTS 
The most significant challenge to extending full faith and 
credit to tribal court orders via a constitutional amendment 
would be the difficulty of passing the amendment. In Minnesota, 
as of 2018, 213 constitutional amendments have been voted on 
with 120 of them adopted.244 Because a little over half of pro-
posed amendments pass, this bodes well for the success of get-
ting the amendment adopted. However, proposing the amend-
ment is only one step in the process. It could be challenging to 
get popular support in the legislature. 
Considering the recent changes to Rule 10 of the Minnesota 
General Rules of Practice, there is at least some awareness and 
desire to give more respect to tribal court orders. The fact that 
the recent amendment had overwhelming support and no orga-
nized opposition makes it more likely a constitutional amend-
ment could succeed.245 There have also been other signs in the 
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political arena that indicate passage of a constitutional amend-
ment would be possible. One such example is the 2013 Executive 
Order issued by Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton that called 
for increased interaction with Tribal nations and the strength-
ening of the bond between the two sovereigns.246 Tribal courts 
have come a long way since the Ex parte Crow Dog decision.247 
Due to the work of dedicated individuals and groups, tribal 
courts have survived and thrived despite the ups and downs they 
have faced. Nonetheless, amending the Minnesota State Consti-
tution is no easy task and will require a lot of advocating and 
educating to help legislators and voters arrive at an informed 
decision. 
Individuals who oppose extending full faith and credit to 
tribal court orders are likely to employ the same paternalistic 
arguments that have always been made in this area of the law. 
Chief among these arguments is that tribal courts are simply not 
competent and cannot be trusted.248 Perhaps critics simply can-
not accept the fact tribal judicial systems further a different set 
of cultural customs and values as compared to American courts 
and are not fully adversarial. Advancing a different set of cul-
tural customs and values is not an indication of how competent 
a judicial system is. There have been plenty of examples of non-
adversarial courts having tremendous results, such as the Leech 
Lake-Cass County Wellness Court.249 These arguments lack 
weight and should not gain any traction considering the realities 
of tribal judicial systems today.250 There are, however, three op-
position positions that have some merit, but are not sufficient to 
overcome the benefits of full faith and credit. 
1. The Fairness and Error Concerns 
The first counterargument that holds some water is that, if 
we extend full faith and credit to tribal court orders, there is no 
way to ensure that due process was required. The argument that 
follows is that we should be performing a “fairness check” on 
 
2018) (demonstrating that only two submissions received by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court opposed the recent amendment). 
 246. Governor Mark Dayton, Exec. Order No. 13-10, MINN. EXECUTIVE DEP’T 
(Aug. 8, 2013), https://mn.gov/governor/assets/EO-13-10.pdf_tcm1055-92492 
.pdf. 
 247. See supra Part I.A.1.a. 
 248. See supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 249. Wahwassuck, supra note 14, at 755. 
 250. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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tribal court orders because a judgment from another foreign na-
tion are normally subject to such a check. The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 482 (1987) lays out the 
grounds for recognition of foreign court judgements.251 Some of 
the factors a court can consider are (1) whether the issuing court 
had jurisdiction, (2) whether the judgment was obtained by 
fraud, and (3) whether the judgment contravenes the public pol-
icy of the United States.252 Accordingly, the same principle 
should apply to the recognition of tribal judgments because 
tribes are more similar to a foreign nation than they are to a 
state. 
To the contrary, tribes are more similar to states than they 
are to a foreign nation.253 Even if tribes were to be more like a 
foreign nation, tribal judgments should be given more deference 
than they are now because tribes receive less deference than a 
foreign nation. Comparing the level of deference given to an or-
der under Minnesota’s Rule 10 and the Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law, the Restatement gives significantly more defer-
ence.254 It simply does not make sense that a tribal court, pre-
sided over by a judge who graduated from an American law 
school, that is ten miles down the road from the recognizing court 
is given less deference than a court that is thousands of miles 
away. Further, this disparity is even more striking when you 
consider tribal courts are sure to mirror courts of the United 
States more than courts of a foreign nation because of the pleth-
ora of statutes that have sought to control the development of 
tribal courts to be reflective of Anglo-American values.255 A state 
constitutional mandate of full faith and credit to tribal court or-
ders would recognize the differences between tribal and foreign 
courts and help settle the disparity in deference that exists. 
Another response to the fairness and error counterargument 
is that even if the tribal judgment lacked fairness, or an error 
was made, there are still ways that a judgment can be attacked 
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under a full faith and credit mandate. The losing litigant could 
challenge the tribal judgment through those avenues of review 
that remain open within the tribal court where the original ad-
judication took place, such as filing an appeal in the tribal 
court.256 If recognition of the tribal judgment is sought in state 
court, a litigant could oppose on three grounds: (1) collateral at-
tack on jurisdiction; (2) public policy exception; and (3) state 
court equivalent of a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 
attack. 
Under a full faith and credit mandate, one can still attack 
the judgment on grounds that the issuing court did not have ju-
risdiction.257 If the litigant is able to establish this, the order 
would not be recognized.258 Supreme Court precedent seems to 
suggest that when a judgment is sought to be recognized via a 
full faith and credit mandate, the recognizing court can refuse to 
enforce the order if it does not comport with public policy.259 This 
is an escape hatch for litigants to utilize if the tribal judgment 
does not seem fair or significant errors were made. Lastly, a Rule 
60 attack allows a litigant to obtain relief from a judgment that 
is based on factors such as whether the judgment was obtained 
through fraud, whether the judgment is void, and whether the 
judgment was made under excusable neglect.260 Takings these 
safeguards together, there are adequate protections against 
judgments being recognized that are not “fair” or were made via 
error. 
Lastly, if the recognizing court is allowed to perform a “fair-
ness check” to the extent that judicial comity allows, this would 
not be in keeping with principles of res judicata. The three main 
principles of res judicata are to: (1) conserve judicial economy; 
(2) establish certainty and respect for the judgments of courts; 
and (3) protect the interests of the party relying on the judg-
ment.261 If a “fairness check” was allowed, similar problems that 
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are seen under judicial comity, such as delay and lack of recog-
nition for orders that are required to be recognized pursuant to 
a state or federal mandate, would occur. In sum, this counterar-
gument raises some fair points, but is not persuasive for the rea-
sons stated above. 
2. Disparity of Justice 
The second counterargument tracks closely with the first. 
The argument is that the level of justice and competency of indi-
vidual tribal courts will vary from court to court, so there needs 
to be a “check” on the tribal courts to ensure that justice is being 
administered evenly. The argument continues that judicial com-
ity is the only way that this concern can be addressed. 
This argument is correct to assert that the competency of 
each tribal court will vary. However, this is true in any judicial 
system, and is not cause to be less deferential to tribal courts. 
Further, this argument is paternalistic in that it posits that An-
glo-American conceptions of justice should be strictly applied to 
tribal courts. The same concern about uneven administration of 
justice applies to state judicial systems.262 Even though the same 
concerns exists with state courts, state court judgments receive 
full faith and credit while tribal judgments do not. There will 
always be a disparity in skill and competence among courts, but 
to categorically exclude tribal courts without concrete evidence 
of a lack of competence is itself uneven justice. Getting rid of the 
“checks” on tribal courts that exist under judicial comity and opt-
ing to extend deference via a full faith and credit mandate will 
increase “a reviewing court’s ability to appreciate the possibili-
ties of a deep diversity model of tribal-national relations, 
whereby tribal norms can diverge from federal and state norms 
and yet still be recognized as valid expressions of American iden-
tity deserving respect and legal recognition.”263 
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3. A Full Faith and Credit Mandate Could Lead to Forum 
Shopping 
The last concern that some may raise is that granting full 
faith and credit to tribal court orders might lead to forum shop-
ping. A litigant might choose to file their case in a state court 
because they know the law is more favorable to the facts of their 
case, which is a form of forum shopping. To the contrary, a grant 
of full faith and credit is likely to decrease forum shopping as 
compared to judicial comity.264 Safeguards such as the Erie doc-
trine, which helps reduce forum shopping,265 do not exist be-
tween tribal and state courts because they are separate sover-
eigns and have different laws. “[T]he full faith and credit 
doctrine is fairly toothless as a choice-of-law mechanism, as 
states may often simply ignore the laws of other states by invok-
ing the public policy exception, and that it operates primarily as 
a means for establishing the finality and uniformity of judg-
ments throughout the nation.”266 On its face, this may seem to 
be a less than desirable fact. However, what this means is that 
if a litigant brought a case in state court instead of tribal court 
because the law is more favorable, the state court judge could 
choose to apply tribal law. The discretion that judges have in the 
choice-of-law context under a mandate of full faith and credit 
would mean that judges can prevent forum shopping as they see 
fit. 
CONCLUSION 
Tribal courts are a unique entity that have a long and sto-
ried history. The law that creates the framework that tribal, 
state, and federal courts interact in is complex and muddled. The 
level of respect and deference shown to tribal courts as compe-
tent judicial forums is grossly out of line with reality. The low 
level of deference shown to tribal courts not only complicates the 
relationship between the three sovereigns, it also leads to unjust 
results that are a holdover of hundreds of years of oppression 
and colonialism. The delay and wrongful denial of tribal judg-
ments in Minnesota led the Minnesota Supreme Court to prom-
ulgate significant changes to Rule 10 of the Minnesota General 
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Rules of Practice. The recent changes are a step in the right di-
rection, but they fail to adequately address the problems in this 
area of the law, given that the new rule is still one of judicial 
comity. This Note argues that state legislatures should amend 
their state constitutions to give full faith and credit to tribal 
court orders to best increase tribal sovereignty and clarify the 
status of tribal courts in the American legal system. The policy 
reasons and mutual benefits that tribes and states will see under 
such a mandate make now the optimum time for state legisla-
tures to start considering a change. 
 
